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| Shi Tao |
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| Illegally providing state secrets |
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![[Release Date]](img/highlight/case-release.gif) |
| November 23, 2014 |
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The Olympics as a Force for Change
[First printed in China Rights Forum, No.1 2003]
In early 2003, HRIC invited several individuals
with diverse backgrounds to carry out
an e-mail discussion on the possible impact
of the 2008 Olympics on the human rights
situation in China, and possible strategies
for promoting human rights advocacy,
education, and democratic reforms.
The Participants
Anne Callaghan has been the Campaigns Manager for Free
Tibet Campaign (www.freetibet.org) since August 2000,
and has been working on the Olympics campaign since the
beginning of her tenure. FTC's Olympic campaign work is
coordinated through an international coalition called the
International Tibet Support Network, which consists of more
than 100 groups from around the world.
Gao Zhan is a researcher at American University
(www.american.edu), specializing in China, Chinese
politics, gender and family. She was detained and falsely
charged by the Chinese government in 2001 for doing
research in China.
Andrew McLaughlin is Senior Adviser to the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
(www.icann.org) and Senior Fellow at the Berkman Center
for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School
(http://cyber.law.harvard.edu). He devotes most of his
time to advising governments and fostering Internet
deployment in developing countries.
Bobson Wong is executive director of the Digital Freedom
Network (DFN) (www.dfn.org), a New York-based
organization that promotes human rights education and
activism around the world, primarily through the use of
Internet technology. Specializing in the Internet in China,
Bobson has written on freedom of expression and Internet
access for Columbia University's Center for the Study of
Human Rights, the Human Rights Encyclopedia, the U.S.
Congressional-Executive Committee on China, and others.
Moderator: Sharon Hom is executive director of HRIC,
and is professor of law, emerita, CUNY School of Law. Sharon has over 14 years of experience in U.S.–China law training
and legal exchange initiatives, and has conducted numerous
NGO consultations and human rights workshops.
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HRIC — To what extent do you think the 2008 Olympics will
have a positive, negative, or mixed effect on the human
rights situation in China? What specific issues and relevant
factors are likely to influence this effect?
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Gao Zhan — I believe the 2008 Olympics will have a mixed
effect on the human rights situation in China.
Because China has highly politicized its hosting of the
Olympics, it is using every possible means to ensure success.
As a result we see the authorities arresting more political
dissidents, driving more non-Beijingers out of the city,
demolishing more houses against the will of their owners
who have lived there for generations, and keeping a tighter
control over the flow of information.
But the flip side is the event will force China to loosen its
grip on some media outlets. Merely for the sake of showing
the world that Chinese do enjoy some basic freedoms, China
will gradually lift some website blocks, allow in more
foreign press, and tolerate to a certain extent the flow of
information from outside of China as it prepares for the
event. And ordinary Chinese folks will take advantage of this
and enlighten themselves with information from the West.
A well-informed and enlightened nation will not be
suppressed for too long.
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Bobson Wong — I don't think the Olympics by itself will have
any major effect on human rights in China. Other factors will
be far more important, such as labor unrest and the state of
the economy. However, the world will be watching China
during the Olympics. Whether this will help or hurt human
rights in China depends on what happens beforehand.
On the one hand, the government wouldn't dare crack
down on dissidents right before or during the Olympics
if the world is watching.The 1989 Tiananmen Square
demonstrations didn't get international attention until
foreign journalists arrived in Beijing to cover Mikhail
Gorbachev's visit.We've all seen in the past how China tends
to ease restrictions while major international events are taking place in China. If anything happens during the
Olympics—any labor strikes or Falungong protests—the
entire world will know instantly with potentially disastrous
results for the government.
On the other hand, precisely because of the increased
scrutiny, you can bet that the government will try to remove
any traces of dissent before the Olympics. (Unfortunately,
this is not limited to China; many U.S. cities like to remove
homeless people from the streets before national
conventions or other major events.) Look for a crackdown in
the years before the event and perhaps a modest easing of
restrictions during the Olympics (such as a lifting of Internet
restrictions to show how "open" China is). A few dissidents
might even be allowed to speak out, although most Chinese
citizens probably won't hear them.
The key, then, is to continue to monitor human rights
now, well before the Beijing Olympics—because by 2008 it
will be too late.The wild card in all of this is whether groups
like Falungong, peasants, or factory workers can organize
protests during the Olympics without being detected. If they
can, then the government is in for a big surprise in 2008.
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Andrew McLaughlin — The impact of the 2008 Olympics
on China's human rights environment will depend to a large
extent upon the behavior of (1) the sponsors, such as
Coca-Cola, (2) the IOC, (3) the national Olympic
committees and their athletes, and (4) the attending
broadcast and print journalists.
I am not optimistic about the IOC, whose president
regularly mentions the beneficial effect of the Olympics on
China's "social environment...including human rights," but
has taken no institutional steps to hold China to the promises
made by the official Beijing bid committee. This is a case
where bureaucracy could be the friend of human rights—
the IOC could establish an office responsible for monitoring
and reporting to the IOC on the state of China's human
rights environment and press freedom. Those two issues
should be of ongoing concern for the IOC, in part to assess
whether the Beijing bid committee's commitments are being
fulfilled. A quarterly report from a monitoring officer would
help to maintain steady pressure on the Chinese authorities
to keep their promises. However, as I mentioned, I see no
sign that the IOC will take any such step.
The Olympics' sponsors, such as Coca-Cola, are in a
similar position to communicate expectations that China
will live up to its commitments, and to complain when
they are violated. Beijing is no doubt counting on major
sponsorship dollars; potential sponsors should make clear
that their sponsorship decisions will rest in part on evidence
that the human rights environment in China is improving.
The Coca-Cola web page on its Olympic sponsorship,
however, makes no mention of institutional concern or
expectations for human rights in China.
During actual course of the Beijing Olympics, the
national Olympic committees (and their athletes) will be in
a position to speak out on behalf of prisoners of conscience
and other unfairly jailed dissidents. Protected from arrest by the glare of Olympic hoopla, the leading athletes will have
the eyes of the world on them.
Finally, the attending print and broadcast journalists
should test China's promises of full journalistic freedom to
push the limits of what has previously been allowed -- like
good journalists anywhere, they should roam Beijing,
investigating and documenting the reality of China's human
rights abuses.
In broadest terms, the application of steady, public
pressure on the Chinese authorities by outsiders (especially
those with economic, diplomatic, or media leverage) can
foster strong incentives for improved behavior. The Chinese
authorities are human beings; they care about their
reputations.The various outside parties associated with the
2008 Olympics will be in an unusually strong position to
influence those reputations by drawing attention to human
rights abuses and pressuring the Chinese authorities not to
disgrace the promises and commitments they have made.
Early signs of attention to human rights by the IOC and the
sponsors are not, however, encouraging.
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Anne Callaghan — Our focus has been to try and pressurize the
IOC to take up human rights concerns as part of its planning
process with Beijing, thus creating incentive for reform and
positive change.That is proving to be rather too demanding
for the IOC at present.
My thoughts on possible positive effects of the Olympics
are as follows:
Media freedom – The Chinese authorities have made some
promises on in guaranteeing media freedom for the Games,
although they have not been specific about the time frame or
scope. I would hope that the media and media freedom organizations would begin to test China's promise on this
score, bringing real heat to the issue. But we also need to ask,
will the world' s media be able to transmit independently of
any Chinese communication system to prevent blockages?
Freedom of expression – Sadly, I think that this area may not
improve, given China's overwhelming obsession with
putting on problem-free Games and trying to ensure that the
Games do not provide an outlet for criticism of the Party.
Examples of this include the arrest of Shan Chengfeng and
his sentencing to 2 years in a labor camp in the very week
that the IOC Evaluation Committee was in Beijing to evaluate
the bid in February 2001.Who is going to press China on
these issues when companies from the USA and Europe will
be desperate to win bids for infrastructure and services for
the Games or open up the Chinese marketplace?
Internet freedom – I think it is likely that China will continue
to clamp down on Web sites, and the authorities are
becoming more sophisticated in blocking sites.
Freedom of movement – Given that the world's press may well
be camped in Beijing for the Games, it will be interesting to
see how China ensures that persons it regards as
"undesirables" (citizens or foreigners) do not get to move
freely within China.
Labor rights – What guarantees will there be that no prison
labor will be used in the manufacture or delivery of good
related to the Olympics?
Security – It is hard to know what state the world will be in
by 2008, but certainly China has been quick to use the
current situation to justify its clampdown on "splittists" and
"extremists." The IOC also seems to be stressing security
considerations with Beijing and Athens 2004 at the moment,
and it was one of the issues [IOC president Jacques] Rogge
raised with us when we queried the continued reliance by
the IOC on its clause stipulating that no political meetings or
demonstrations are allowed to take place in the week
running up to, during and after the Olympic Games.Will
companies be drafted to help them create or run the
technology required to do that? Interestingly, it's possible
that increased access to technology could help dissident
groups or external groups bypass official blocking systems as
they try to raise human rights issues during the Games.
Tibet – I have a mixed response to this, as it's impossible to
say what Hu Jintao will be like as a leader or whether he will
be as sensitive to the world's perception of him as Jiang was
(witness the release of Ngawang Sangdrol [a Tibetan nun
imprisoned in 1992] in advance of Jiang's visit to the USA in
October 2002).We have to remember that Hu was the man
who oversaw the imposition of martial law in Tibet in 1988.
Will he be paramount leader by 2008, or will Jiang still be
guiding things through his people, or indeed will there be
someone new to contend with? I think the Chinese
leadership's approach to reform and desire for openness will
determine Tibet's future and whether the initial discussions
that occurred in September 2002 might actually blossom
into a fully-fledged dialogue for a peaceful settlement on the
issue of Tibet.
Xinjiang – My fear is that the situation here will continue to deteriorate as the Chinese leadership does seem to be
targeting the country rather viciously.
Political prisoners/fair trials – Again, I have mixed feelings on
this. Will there be a moratorium on arrests or will the
Olympics be used as a blanket to cover up what is going on?
It might be worth taking at look at what happened during
the UN Women's conference in 1995.
Certainly, some Tibetan delegates were harassed and
denied a visa, but what we should find out is whether there
was a stepping up of arrests or release of prisoners to divert
attention from the bigger picture.
Death penalty – Will there be mass sentencing rallies around
the time of the Games? If this happened, it would be harder
to argue why the Chinese government would do such a thing
if they weren't ashamed or worried about affect of the death
penalty on China's image.
Religious freedom – As with the death penalty and political
prisoners, I'm not sure whether China will try to tone down
its harassment of religious minorities.The situation in Tibet
and the other "autonomous" provinces could be a source of
embarrassment to the Chinese authorities. However, they
may try to paint themselves as an all-inclusive country
through "supporters" from these communities, possibly
coercing entire populations into mass displays.
Release of political prisoners – I would think that there would
be at least some high profile releases well in advance of the
Games to try and take the sting out of the human rights
question.What strikes me after having heard a presentation
from a Chinese delegate from the Beijing committee at a
sporting conference in October 2002 is that they are tired of
hearing the human rights arguments when they present
what the Games will look like, but they haven't yet
formulated any convincing arguments to repel them.What
would particularly interest us is if the Panchen Lama might
be freed in advance of ratification of some international
instrument. China may well have ratified the ICCPR by this
point and may use ratification of other UN instruments to
counter human rights arguments.
Corruption/transparency – China is quite sensitive on this
subject but given the amount of money that will be involved
in the Games, there is huge potential for wide-scale
corruption. Perhaps if foreign companies could be persuaded
to be openly transparent about their financial dealings in this
respect and pressured to come clean, this could have a
positive effect and set a precedent.
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Sharon Hom — Thanks to everyone for your responses. From
each of your respective perspectives—NGO advocacy,
Internet policy, academic, and personal experience with
China's security apparatus—you have raised a rich range of
issues. As the moderator, I am joining in at this point to raise
some additional questions.
Gao Zhan points out the highly politicized nature of the
bid and the hosting of the Olympics and suggests that the
Olympics will have a mixed effect on the human rights
situation. It is clear that the PRC government has effectively
raised the nationalism banner to mobilize public support for the hosting of the Olympics, as well as to silence critical
political debate or attention to ongoing human rights
violations in the name of national security or social stability.
This appeal to nationalism for political purposes (e.g.
maintaining control) is also effective in undermining
international human rights activists' efforts to promote
uncensored public debates and free flow of information.
So one follow-up question is: how can/should concerned
actors address or respond to the very effective deployment of
nationalism here by the PRC government? What strategies
(rhetorical, advocacy, media, other?) can be explored to
expose the political uses of appeal to nationalism?
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Gao Zhan — In addition to carrying out counter-propaganda
activities on the media front, we should also play politics
with the Chinese on their hosting of the Olympic Games.
Two things we could think of doing: we can exert pressure
on the U.S. Congress and the IOC by revealing to them how
China is exploiting the opportunity of hosting the Games,
and we can ask them to pass resolutions condemning the
Chinese government and demanding improvement.We
could do this by visiting the offices of members of Congress
and by writing to IOC officials, or by hosting press
conferences or other public forums.
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Anne Callaghan — I see a number of possible rhetorical
responses that would defuse the pro-nationalism argument.
Some examples:
– "Doesn't China Deserve Human Rights for Life – Not Just
for the Olympics?"
– "Give Human Rights a Sporting Chance"
– "Chinese People Deserve Olympics, Corrupt Regime
Does Not"
I think it's important to reach out to Chinese
communities, not only in China, but also abroad.
Embarrassment strategies might also be effective. For
example, we could elaborate on how various regimes have
sought to use the Olympics to justify their human rights
practices. Another possibility would be to stage public stunts
and/or press briefings at the Athens 2004 Olympics that
might test China's approach to the Olympics. In addition, we
could consider ways to embarrass the IOC Evaluation
Committee.
Ideally we need to find athletes and other sporting
personalities willing to speak out for human rights.We can
also apply pressure on Olympic sponsors by examining their
public statements on human rights and pointing out contradictions
with their Olympic promotion.
Regarding media strategies, we should target
International Press Freedom Day in May or the International
Olympic Day in June to raise questions about the extent of
media freedom in China.
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Sharon Hom — Bobson Wong makes a distinction between the
direct impact of the Olympics and the opportunities for
making an impact due to a "world will be watching"
context. He predicts a crackdown in the years leading up to
the Olympics and perhaps a modest easing of some Internet
restrictions to show China's openness. In suggesting that the
key is monitoring human rights now, Bobson, can you talk
more about DFN's plans in the lead-up to the Olympics? Can
you also address more generally specific Internet strategies for monitoring human rights situation, (e.g. DFN's excellent
monitoring work), and how to amplify voices from inside
China as well as get uncensored information flow in?
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Bobson Wong — At this point, DFN has no specific plans to do
anything related to the Olympics – not because we don't
think it's important but because we don't feel that tying our
existing human rights monitoring to the Olympics will add
much to the debate.
Empowering voices from within China involves a number
of things.
First, Internet access in China needs to be improved; since
the government is already spending a lot of money on this, I
don't think there's much that people outside China need to
do.
The second thing that needs to happen is for government
filtering of the Internet to be reduced or eliminated.This is a
much trickier thing – there are technological ways to get
around filtering, of course.The problem is that many of these
methods require some persistence - subscribing to e-mail
lists that send you URLs of proxy servers that are only good
for a few days before censors shut them down.This is not for
the casual surfer.What's surprising is the substantial number
of Net users in China who use them – about 10 percent of
urban Internet users in China according to a recent study by
researchers as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.There
is a lot of work to be done in this regard – advancements in
tools like SafeWeb,Triangle Boy, and other technological
methods for circumventing censorship will definitely help.
But technological tools only get you so far because the
government has a lot of money to counteract anti-censorship
tools in what journalists like to call a "cat-and-mouse" game.
These policies won't change unless Internet users in China
feel threatened. Change is not going to come from outside
pressure. It's too late for that. Pressuring western Internet
companies not to do business in China is pointless now
because they have too much money involved to change their
minds. In the last few years, dissidents have been detained
for using the Internet for political purposes and
unfortunately most users in China don't seem to care.
Internet users in China have spoken out when the
government overreached and began affecting the average
user. Look at the outrage from ordinary users last September
after access to Google was temporarily blocked, when
cybercafes in Beijing were shut down in June after a terrible
fire, and after Liu Di (a university student who made the
mistake of protesting government restrictions on the
Internet) was detained. Users are beginning to realize that
the government isn't just targeting dissidents. Ordinary
users' fears that they could be next is more likely to spur
change than any technological advancement.
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Sharon Hom — Anne Callaghan outlines a very thorough
inventory of human rights concerns and issues. On Xinjiang,
the situation is deteriorating and quite serious, and China
has been opportunistically invoking the war against
terrorism to wage its campaign against "separatists." Human Rights Watch and HRIC will be issuing a joint report in the
spring 2003 on Xinjiang that we hope will generate more
attention to the ongoing human rights abuses there. Some
questions for Anne and everyone:
– In pressing for guarantees for media freedom during
the games (and leading up to the Games?), what kinds
of specific guarantees can you suggest in terms of time
frame or scope?
– Are there any thoughts on Anne's question regarding the
technological ability of international media to
broadcast independently of a Chinese (and censored)
communication system?
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Anne Callaghan — On pressing for specific guarantees, one
possibility would be to highlight one specific theme over
and above the others each year. However, given the scope of
human rights abuses involved and the need for year-on-year
improvement, I would prefer more of a "report card"
format, giving "end of term marks" to China on its human
rights record.
On media freedom I suggest pressing for these
guarantees:
– Unrestricted media access to all areas of China
– No media handlers during visits or interviews
– No interference with the publication or transmission of
reports on human rights or political issues
– Removing site bans on the Web (with external monitoring
on whether the number of affected sites has decreased, and
whether key sites can be accessed)
Apart from making demands on the Chinese government, I
think we should also encourage the cooperation of
outside actors.
For instance, there could be a Hot Spot Identification
program, through which front-line reporters could report
back on how media freedom is frustrated.These reports
should be tracked for follow-up in subsequent years to
see if there's been any improvement.
We should also press Internet providers to challenge
China's site bans and to withdraw from "voluntary codes."
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Bobson Wong — I am not completely familiar with the abilities
of satellite technology in circumventing local filters.
However, if past history is any guide, I doubt that the
government would censor information going out of
China to the rest of the world. I think it's more likely
that the government would censor information that
people in China could see.
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Sharon Hom — In terms of developing concrete measurable
"benchmarks" for assessing and monitoring
the human rights situation in China in the lead-up to
the Olympics, what areas would you suggest these
focus on? For example, HRIC is exploring the first year's
benchmark (2003) as focusing on the release of all
political prisoners, especially those still imprisoned
for the now non-existent crime of counter-revolutionary
activity.
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Anne Callaghan — I would like to see the following
benchmarks:
– Political prisoners – press for the release of all still being
held for the now-non-existent crime of counterrevolutionary
activity by the end of 2003 (but is it legally
feasible to accomplish this so quickly?)
– Prison labor – develop codes of conduct relating to mer
chandise manufactured in prison labor camps.We could
call on Olympics sponsors to monitor implementation of
the codes.
– International obligations – call on China to adhere to its
cur rent international obligations, and to ratify the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
– Olympics preparation – Beijing authorities should pledge
not to use the Olympics to justify a human rights
crackdown or forced removal of people from their homes.
– Tibet issues – call for China to grant impartial international
observers access to the Panchen Lama, Gedhun Choekyi
Nyima. Access should in particular be granted to Special
Rapporteurs on torture and religious freedom.
– Also on Tibet – press for full and unconditional
negotiations with Tibet's Government in Exile by 2004.
One other thought is to look at possibilities for including
the Olympics as part of areas studied by the various relevant
Special Rapporteurs - and within UN committees. For
example, the International Covenant on Economic Social
and Cultural Rights could provide an opportunity for
examining China's record linked to rights abuses associated
with the Games.
In addition, special hearings could be held within
Congress or various parliaments analyzing the information
and debating whether companies should be allowed to bid
for contracts that may facilitate human rights abuse – I'm
thinking particularly of security and monitoring equipment.
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Sharon Hom — Thanks to everyone for making the time to
share your ideas and perspectives in this round-table
discussion. Anne's thorough coverage of the breadth of issues
and specific strategy ideas clearly reflect the effective
advocacy and research grounding the Free Tibet Campaign.
Bobson offered good insights regarding the role of
technology in developing strategies for empowering more
voices within China. Gao Zhan and Andrew offered mixed
assessments on the likely impact (or not) of the Olympics on
China's human rights environment. As HRIC moves forward
with our Incorporating Responsibility 2008 campaign, we
invite ongoing discussion and input from all of you as well
as from all our readers.W e hope that by sharing ideas and
collaborating on specific strategies, we can work together in
the coming years to maximize the window of opportunity
for making a greater impact on the improving the human
rights situation in China.
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